Orange Shirt Day - Reflections

The very first step is a kind of recognition that some injustice has occurred. It might not see the full scope of that injustice, but it recognizes that here, to our fellow Canadians, something very wrong has happened.

It follows that someone who has this recognition will dig deeper, through a process of self-education (at this very early stage), into the history of these events. It will soon be seen that a profound tragedy has taken place, a profound injustice, to these peoples, the original inhabitants of these beautiful lands. And though I have had no hand in any kind of direct action against them, one will soon see that this injustice was done in my name, that is, the Canadian.

Very soon the impulse to “make things right” will arise in the heart. After much more reading, and listening to those who have been impacted, it will become evident that it is not possible to “make things right”, that such an event, or series of events have occurred on such a scale and quality that something irreversible has taken place.

One will also be filled with uncertainties about the role one should play, what right one has to even speak or participate in such a “making right”.

I am of the opinion that, as a Canadian, I can first, recognize the injustice; second, name it and draw attention to it; third, continue to try to understand and educate myself, either through reading of histories or through the very words of those who have survived; and finally, I can take part in initiatives that seek to address the wrongs done and look for some kind of way forward.

But most importantly: Listen. Not to me and my reflections here, but to the indigenous peoples of Canada. My intentions are good, but I haven’t lived their lives.

Please don’t harden your heart.

Kant on Freedom

Hence in a practical context (whenever duty is at issue), we understand perfectly well what freedom is; for theoretical purposes, however, as regards the causality of freedom (and equally its nature) we cannot even formulate without contradiction the wish to understand it.

Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason

Sarkozy

In the wake of the Toulouse siege and the killing of self-proclaimed al-Qaeda operative Mohamed Merah, French President Nicolas Sarkozy has stated:

From now on, any person who habitually consults websites that advocate terrorism or that call for hatred and violence will be punished by the law. Telegraph.uk

Of course we might ask the President what precisely constitutes "terrorism" or how one should understand "advocate." Does activity calling for a new form of government fall into the category? We might also wish to inquire as to the content of the term "consults." At what point, Monsieur President, does a consultation become "habitual?" After two times? A dozen? Is it merely the observation of a website, perhaps out of curiosity, or is it only observation with malice? How can one tell the difference? He does not say, for example, that anyone who consults a certain website and then commits a crime will be punished, but rather that consulting a website is itself a crime.

The logic here is Christian but with a twist. In Christian teaching, one can look but not think (looking at a woman to lust after her is the same as committing adultery), for Sarkozy, one perhaps might think, but they certainly cannot look. They are two sides of the same coin. What the ultimate totalitarian ruler would demand is that one not look or think. To achieve this one might meld together the right leaning secular state (France) and Christian moral teaching. One will deal with the outward appearance of things, while the other will monitor the inner condition of its citizens. Only then can we be safe.

"Anarchy"

The actions of the so-called "Anarchists" in Toronto today are condemned. I hesitate here to use the term "Anarchists". Those whom I refer to are hoodlums and cowards. Can one imagine Emma Goldman, for example, hiding her face beneath a handkerchief while throwing a brick through a Starbucks window? She had too much dignity to do either. These are the actions of the childish, the urban frustrated, the impotent. What righteousness, what fidelity to the cause it must have taken to hide behind rags and break windows! Are these actions anything but a violent passage à l'act, reflecting in their perpetrators the very ends they wish to accomplish: the eradication of the degenerate dirt of city life? They, for a moment, become the degenerate dirt themselves, an ironical -becoming- of the urban symptomatic whose source they wish to destroy. Are their actions not a symptom of the urban pathology itself? It is no wonder one can find "Anarchist" journals containing cartoons advocating the destruction of the urban environment and a reversion to our primitive rural origins. Step 1: Tear up bricks and sidewalks to destroy and drive away capitalists and police. Step 2: Shut down the city through whatever means possible. Step 3: Allow nature to overtake the city. Step 4: Throw away all our clothing and live a vegan lifestyle. Here Žižek's prescription for the Left is as pertinent as ever: "Marx has said: 'The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it..' But is it not now more important than ever to re-examine this? Rather than try to change the world (unthinkingly), is it not time for philosophers to interpret it so that proper action may be taken?" This is finally how one should read the contemporary urban Anarchist movement: as symptomatic of an urban pathology, complete with Utopian ecological vision and rites of passage.

A Secular Age -reflection-

Having just completed Taylor's A Secular Age and having presented an analysis of it to my colleagues, I feel leaving a few of my reflections here makes for good closure.

One major conclusion I made was that Taylor and Žižek are in fact trying to do the same thing: revitalize their respective traditions with a vision of renewal. Taylor, following Péguy's comments, could have just as easily been quoting Žižek:

"Creative renewal was only possible in action which by its very nature had to have a certain temporal depth. This kind of action had to draw on the forms which had been shaped in a deeper past, but not by a simple mechanical reproduction, as with “habit”, rather by a creative re-application of the spirit of the tradition."

It was Lenin, when faced with implementing the New Economic Policy in 1922 (after the Bolshevik Revolution), a policy allowing a greater market economy and private ownership, who said it is sometimes necessary to “begin from the beginning” again and again. Žižek, apropos the Left, says this repeatedly. Following Badiou he emphasizes a fidélité à l’événement (Fidelity to the Event), in this case, a fidelity within a given context which is always "beginning from the beginning" in a creative reinterpretation of the emancipatory Idea. This is precisely Taylor's formulation for the Christian Church (sans the transcendent):

"The goal in this case is not to return to an earlier formula, inspiring as many of these will undoubtedly be; there will always be an element of imitation of earlier models, but inevitably and rightly Christian life today will look for and discover new ways of moving beyond the present orders to God."

Some Christians have begun to do this, to contextualize and move beyond traditional forms, while creatively reapplying the "spirit of the tradition". Whether they will gather momentum remains to be seen, a large part of this depending on their ability to avoid defining themselves by what they are not, or what they perceive themselves to be a corrective to. These considerations should not even enter the equation. Another risk will involve making the particular the universal, imposing some local form as a mould for all others. So a particular form may be successful (transformative etc), we may write books about it, others may start to think it would be possible to transplant the forms in other places (didn't something analogous to this happen with communism, so that we have Russian communism, Chinese communism, Cuban communism, etc, each taking on slightly or radically different form?). No, both Taylor (the transcendent frame) and Žižek (the immanent frame) insist on the key concept of contextualization, serving the Idea (which is Universal) of the movement from precisely where one is. Each of these emancipatory groups (or Christian groups, who may also have an emancipatory orientation in the Leftist sense) form a kind of communion. Taylor sees the way forward as a “communion of itineraries”, a multiplicity of “whole lives”.

So much more could be said here, but this will suffice for now. I close Taylor's massive tome with a new appreciation for this Catholic thinker at McGill. I am richer because of him. To be continued...

Christian Charity

I was recently reminded of a “real” which we should often reflect upon: Christians give more to charity, do more charitable work, than any other single group. Studies indicate that the churchgoer gives up to twice as much to charity as any other person, religious or non-religious (giving even more to non-religious affiliated charities than non-Christians). In addition to charitable work, Christians also provide an impressive degree of first-response disaster relief. Name a disaster in the last fifty years and a Christian-affiliated response team was among the first ones there.

Even if one takes into account the fact that a great deal of Christian giving goes towards “ministers' salaries, church upkeep, and Sunday School” the simple fact is that Christians still give more than any other group. What can explain this?

I will delve into the realm of “motivations” only to say this: whether the Christian gives more because they “are forced to” (an ignorant claim I’ve often heard), i.e. it is their (absolute) duty as a Christian, or because they have a genuine concern for the suffering of the world, matters little to me. In fact, one could argue that "giving as a duty" takes nothing away from the charitable act, but speaks a great deal rather about the integrity of an ideology that requires providing assistance to others. What concerns me here is the outcome: Do the suffering receive aid? Motivations are a moot point (though I would accept an argument which attacks a “charity” with strings attached). In a twist on St. Paul’s discussion concerning the preaching of the gospel: “But what does it matter? The important thing is that in every way, whether from false motives or true, Christ is preached. And because of this I rejoice” (Phil. 1:18) -What does it matter? (Why question the motives of the Christian here?) The important thing is that Christians give more, whether from false motives or true, to the aid organizations of the world. And because of this I rejoice.

Apart from motivations, one of the major contributing factors to this incredible amount of Christian giving must certainly be related to organizational structure. I've touched on this briefly in a previous blog (in relation to the possibility of reconciliation): Isn't it precisely the Christian system, a system which provides a structure within which giving is made a simple matter, a system in which large groups of people are effectively empowered to give, in which giving itself is a kind of cherished narrative within the community, that has contributed to the success of Christian charity? (This should give those anti-organizational Christians pause: Do not forget the power of an organized people to change the world).

I agree here with my beloved philosopher: The way to show our respect for an authority (an individual or organization, political or not) is to be ruthlessly critical. I want to add: And let us also give honour where honour is due.

Scapegoat

I was thinking about T-- too on the way home.. especially after our readings this last week. Doesn't he function as the scapegoat in this class? The rest of us certainly have banded together to form a kind of expulsionary alliance against him.. expulsion in the sense that our primary mode as group toward him is one of alienation. T-- is "the one" in every crowd. In his identification as scapegoat (the exlusionary subject) we are united and cohesive. In a sense the group owes him more than we know.

This, however, presupposes the veracity of the mimetic model. Do we really "believe" that T-- is the scapegoat in our miming of one another? My issue here is that imitation is never authentic, in the sense that only the originary subject/s can claim. Imitation, by definition, is never authentic: it only thinks it is. What we try to convince ourselves, rather, is that "I believe more than you". It's a group one-upmanship which eventually leads to the slaughter of the sacrificial victim. This is why I disagree with the internal mechanism of the mimetic model (of "real belief": even though I think the outcome is pretty much the same). Understood in this way, there is always room to ask the question "but do I really believe this about T-- or do I only think I should?"

I've thought about this a bit (long drives home are quite conducive to thinking/soul searching), and I've come to the conclusion that I don't really want to be a part of any alliance (even unconsciously) against him, even though his personality makes him an easy target at times. I really have nothing against him. I can certainly disagree with him, even feel his positions may be completely erroneous, but in the end I share his humanity and recognize we've both been shaped by forces we had no control over. Here is freedom and peace I think..

Life After Death (Motivations)

As I indicated before, there are a number of implications stemming from the understanding of life after death that I elaborated previously. First, the category "life after death" is no longer a meaningful designation other than for those who have lost a loved one and who must continue to live after their loved one's death. This first implication makes way for the second, and indeed is grounded in it: Life receives its proper grounding as -here-, as present, as living. This is why the phrase "life after death" has lost any meaning as a reference to "life-death-life" qua subject-who-is-dead. Life is therefore, "life-dying", more accurately: -Life- (there is no life apart from dying: "dying" is life, is yet another manifestation of living). The ones who remain after the particular Life (in an existential-bodily sense), are the only ones who may legitimately speak of "life-after-death". Here "life" represents the one who mourns, and "death" the one who is dead.

I have heard it remarked that if there is no life after death (in the traditional sense) there is no reason to be moral people. Why not rape and steal, murder and destroy, if in the end there is no hell or heaven? I have mixed emotions in response to this right away. First I feel sadness and pity. I feel pity for those whose lives are held under such constraint, who always feel under observation, as if a giant eyeball was hovering just over their heads, watching every move. This of course is an exaggeration, but I think there's something to it insofar as behaviour is mediated through the agency of some big Other. The second response is to ask a simple question: Why then do not all atheists rape and steal, murder and destroy? Why then are there many people who have no religious belief, yet live highly ethical lives, give to charities, help others, etc? For whatever reason, their unbelief contributes not at all to leading criminal lives. This observation leads me to suspect that somehow those who are religious lack a true altruism, or an authentic human compassion for others. Is this not suspect as long as there are motivating factors (heaven, hell, grace)? What motivating factors are there for an atheist? Certainly not as profound ones as eternal life and death. (Once I debated with a Rabbi about just this thing. He claimed that every good act is conditioned by some expectation of personal reward. Even giving your grandmother a birthday card, he said, can lead to one feeling good about oneself, result in praise from parents, etc. Every example I gave he was able to reduce to selfish motives. He accused me of being "Pauline"! It wasn't until some time after that I thought of the case of a soldier jumping on a grenade to save his comrades. Here one may argue that he will gain great acclaim as a hero afterwards etc, in which case it is conceivable he might have done it for selfish reasons, though he will not be able to enjoy the fruit of his actions. I personally think people in this situation either act without a moment's hesitation -and therefore do not even identify the Self- or they deliberate too long and the Self is recognized and preserved. I offer nothing but conjecture here but I would be curious to hear the Rabbi's response).

I do not question here the possibility of a Christian or Muslim acting without the mediating notion of an afterlife. I heard once of a Christian saint who said he would rather spend eternity in hell if it meant he might comfort even a single soul. Here I can only profoundly respect this man as a lover of humanity, and a revolutionist. Is his declaration not the culmination of a certain kind of Christian logic? He has merely taken the implications to their very end. He is willing to step into the very gap that Christ himself is not willing to step into. As long as there is a single individual in hell any notion of Christ's sacrifice for all is meaningless. As long as one person burns Christ's earthly ministry is incomplete. This saint was willing to follow the implications of Jesus' life to their very end, and in a sense, become more a Saviour than the Saviour himself who now sits upon a kingly throne and will judge humanity.

But of course this only makes sense within a certain hermeneutic of reality. The primary question should not be "Why do bad things happen to good people?" but, "Why do bad people (the "ungodly", those without heaven or hell) do good things?" And can one admit that they do? We have still not exhausted this topic. To be continued yet again...

Stem Cell Ethics

Last February I presented a paper to a group of theologians in London concerning the ethics of stem cell research, more specifically, the changing face of stem cell research and the need for theologians to renew their ethical approach. I suggested then that new techniques would soon render obsolete ethical arguments surrounding human embryonic stem cells (hESCs). Today this suggestion is as pertinent as ever. The ability to produce induced pluripotent stem cells (iPSCs) from adult somatic cells is now widely achievable in many labs. This was an important step towards a more ethical and less politically charged issue. Now that hESCs are no longer needed to produce iPSCs (hence the reduction in the number of human embryos that would be destroyed), it almost seems that any ethical opposition has been surmounted. Think again.

An international group of collaborators from Canada, the US, UK, and Japan have called attention to the new set of ethical concerns that should be raised in connection with iPSCs:

1) Because an iPSC will necessarily contain the genetic information of the donor—and, as a result, information about potential disease predispositions—there may be privacy concerns.

2) Consent issues are likely to emerge. iPSC lines could be used for decades for innumerable different studies around the world, some of which may not even have been conceived when the cells were donated. What kind of consent is required to make this ongoing work ethically and legally sound. The right to withdraw from participation in research is a hallmark of traditional research ethics norms. How should this right operate in the context of iPSC research? Can donors of cells for iPSC research withdraw their consent to participate at anytime? If so, must the resultant cell line be destroyed?

3) The pluripotent nature of iPSCs also raises challenges, the most notable arguably being the possible use of human iPSCs to create gametes, which raises several issues, including the creation and destruction of human embryos (which brings us back to older ethical issues).

Are iPSCs a step in the right direction? I think so. The task for theologians (and anyone else who shares similar or related understandings of the human creature) is to remain well-informed, to formulate concerns, and to make their voices heard.

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