AN INTERROGATION OF THE "REAL" IN ALL ITS GUISES
Hamm: What's happening?
Clov: Something is taking its course.
Beckett
Saturday, 23 November 2013
It moves
This is all part of a larger program I've initiated in my life. It involves a reorientation toward real things and people, things I can touch and talk to, things that have a face, or cast shadows. Of course I'm not cutting off the virtual completely. This is in fact impossible- as Zizek has said: "Beyond the fiction of reality, there is the reality of the fiction." I'm simply scaling back on a particular mode of the virtual. Its truths are still present for those who have ears to hear... I've simply heard another sound.
Monday, 30 May 2011
The Church (fragment of a thought)

Is it possible to detect here the difference between a kind of outward objective truth and a more inward subjective one? In other words, is the striving for “understanding-each-other” not a reflection of the recognition of the truth of subjective inner experience, versus another understanding of truth not located primarily in subjective experience, but in action and in an Idea? I wonder how much the former is a reflection of a kind of Schleiermacherian influence on religious subjectivity, and indeed post-modern culture, forced no doubt by the Enlightenment and modernity, and as such is more of a symptom perhaps than an influence. When the conception of an objective yet personal God was being severely called into question by science and modern reason, the move inward was a logical one. One should, however, refer to Wilhelm Dilthey here who suggested this inward move was already present in Christianity from the beginning, against the objectification of truth by the ancient Greeks:
For the Greek mind, knowing was mirroring an objective thing in the intelligence. Now [i.e., in Christianity], experience becomes the focal point of all the interests of the new communities; but this is just simple awareness of what is given in personality and in consciousness of the self.... With the enormous interest they generate, experiences of the will and of the heart swallow up every other object of knowledge.... If this community faith had immediately developed a science perfectly appropriate to it, that science would have to rest on the foundation ultimately resting on inner experience.
Wednesday, 25 May 2011
Theological Thought (an excerpt)
On a broader level Zizek and Badiou’s engagement of theological material raises another question. What is the status of theological thought? Who “owns” it, i.e. who has the right to engage in and utilize it? Is it the special possession of faith traditions, somewhat like the knowledge and apparatuses of various scientific disciplines, or can non-faith participants legitimately comment on religious theology? In other words, does it have the same status as communist egalitarianism, as pointed out by Rancière a propos failed communist communities:
They did not fail, as the opinion goes, because individuals could not submit to the common discipline. On the contrary, they failed because the communist capacity could not be privatized. The sharing of the capacity of anybody could not be turned into the virtue of the private communist man.
Insofar as egalitarianism, ethics, and the Event (in the sense of creative novelty) are concerned, can the Church (or any other monotheistic tradition) not admit that in the past it has “privatized the capacity of anybody,” has made these categories virtues of the religious community as if without the Church everyone would only do “what was right in his/her own eyes,” as if there could be no new subjective creation without the coming of the new person in Christ? It was Alan Watts, that once Anglican minister cum Zen Buddhist who summed up the state of homily during his time in the Church: “So much of the preaching we hear on Sunday morning comes down to this: ‘My dear people, be good!’” So much should be admitted. Does this not reflect, however, a kind of theology that is little more than humanism? If so it is merely a reflection of a kind of contemporary theology concerned with seeming relevant, having given up on the more problematic core of Christian thought, what Badiou refers to as a “fabulation:” the historical status and meaning of the Resurrection. The Church too is not without its reactionaries here. For them the Resurrection is not a historical category but like Badiou, merely provides a hermeneutical substrate for further thought regarding the human subject/community. This too is so obviously a compromise with modernity, one that would cause the one who said “if Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain and your faith is in vain” to roll over in his grave. It reflects a certain cultural type, or because we are speaking of Badiou and Zizek we might properly say “class,” that as a result of a life of relative comfort can no longer identify with the words that follow those just quoted: “If in Christ we have hope in this life only, we are of all people most to be pitied.” In short, it reflects a decadent class theology.
Here then is the limit set upon the appropriation of theology. In so many instances, all of its resources are of the category “capacity of anybody.” It becomes privatized at precisely the point one can say “I have hope in Christ not just in this life only,” i.e. the Resurrection hope theology of the world’s destitute.
Sunday, 20 March 2011
What is the meaning of Jesus? (To a comrade)
